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Abstract 
The need to protect resources against attackers is reflected by huge information security invest-
ments of firms worldwide. In the presence of budget constraints and a diverse set of assets to 
protect, organizations have to decide in which IT security measures to invest, how to evaluate 
those investment decisions, and how to learn from past decisions to optimize future security in-
vestment actions. While the academic literature has provided valuable insights into these issues, 
there is a lack of empirical contributions. To address this lack, we conduct a theory-based ex-
ploratory multiple case study. Our case study reveals that (1) firms’ investments in information 
security are largely driven by external environmental and industry-related factors, (2) firms do 
not implement standardized decision processes, (3) the security process is perceived to impact 
the business process in a disturbing way, (4) both the implementation of evaluation processes 
and the application of metrics are hardly existent and (5) learning activities mainly occur at an 
ad-hoc basis. 
 
Keywords:  Information Security Investments, Multiple Case Study, Organizations, Single Loop 
Learning, Double Loop Learning
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1. Introduction 
More and more organizations are highly reliant on Information Technology (IT) for their busi-
ness operations to the extent that failure of IT systems could even lead to bankruptcy (Kearns & 
Lederer 2004). Additionally, security threats have become more advanced and frequent in the 
past years (Ponemon Institute 2015b): According to a global survey of Grant Thornton, one in 
six businesses has been targeted by a cyber-attack in the past year (Grant Thornton 2015). This 
led to a blow up of the costs caused by security incidents which is shown, for instance, by the 
“2015 Cost of Data Breach Study” of the Ponemon Institute: According to a global study of 350 
companies, the average total cost of all data breaches increased from $3.5 to $3.8 million 
(Ponemon Institute 2015a). In 2015, cybercrime is estimated to have caused $315 billion in dam-
ages worldwide (Grant Thornton 2015). To avoid these damages, organizations need to protect 
systems, data and processes by reducing vulnerabilities and by improving their monitoring capa-
bilities (Gartner 2011). Specifically, they invest into various security technologies that protect 
systems, data and processes against technical failure, damage or attacks such as data loss preven-
tion, spyware detection, removal applications and cryptographic techniques (Gartner 2016; 
Gartner 2011). Information security investments surpassed $75.4 billion worldwide in 2015 ac-
cording to a report of Gartner (2015) and is expected to grow further in 2016 (eWeek 2016). As 
predicted by the SANS Institute’s report “IT Security Spending Trends” both IT and security 
budgets for financial services (including banking and insurance), technology providers, govern-
ment, education and health care are on the rise (SANS Institute 2016). These figures indicate 
large and rising investments of firms in IT security so that organizations are impelled to pay 
thorough consideration to planning and evaluation of their IT security spending.  
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In the presence of budget constraints and a large set of assets to protect, organizations have to 
decide in which IT security measures to invest, how to evaluate those investment decisions and 
how to learn from past decisions to optimize the economic value of future security investment 
actions (Anderson & Schneier 2005; Demetz & Bachlechner 2013; Gordon & Loeb 2006b). We 
identified only a few studies that provide empirical insights in how organizations make decisions 
on IT security investments: For example, Dor & Elovici (2016) investigate up-to-date decision 
making practices regarding information security investment in organizations and Toivanen 
(2015) examine the affecting drivers why information security investment decisions fail. Our 
case study goes beyond the overall body of empirical knowledge on IT security investments, 
which we unfold in more detail in the succeeding section, by exploring in a multiple case study 
how organizations (1) make information security investment decisions depending on environ-
mental factors, (2) evaluate their investment decisions, and (3) organizationally learn from past 
activities when they have to decide on further security investments.  
The key contributions of our case study are as follows: We provide empirical insights that (1) 
firms’ investments in information security are largely driven by external environmental and in-
dustry-related factors, such as legal regulations, industry-specific demands and requirements of 
partner firms, (2) standardized decision processes as provided by academic literature are not ap-
plied in practice, (3) security processes are perceived as having a troublesome and time-
consuming effect on business processes, (4) both the implementation of evaluation processes and 
the application of metrics are hardly existent and (5) learning activities mainly occur on an ad-
hoc basis. 
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The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide the theoretical background of our 
work. Afterwards, in Section 3, we present the research approach used for our case study. Within 
Section 3, we derive the interview question in a theory-based way (Subsection 3.1). In Subsec-
tion 3.2, we present the research sites and in Subsection 3.3, we describe the data collection and 
how we analyzed our collected data. Then, in Section 4, we synthesize the results of the case 
study. In particular, we specify how external factors influence decision to invest in information 
security resources (Subsection 4.1). In Subsection 4.2, we illustrate how investments in infor-
mation security resources based on underlying decision processes are conducted in practice. 
While we show the influence of security processes on business processes with measuring per-
formances in Subsection 4.3, we introduce metrics and evaluation processes used to measure the 
changes in organizational performance in Subsection 4.4. The usage of single and double loop 
learning strategies for information security investments is outlined in Subsection 4.5. These in-
sights are discussed in Section 5 and key propositions are derived: This section is structured 
analogously to Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. 
2. Research on Information Security Investment 
The importance of information security investment has given rise to a growing stream of re-
search. Financial analyses help to identify the assets, threats, vulnerabilities of information sys-
tems and provide an approach for the necessary investment (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažic 2012; 
Bojanc et al. 2012) and to evaluate the value of portfolios of various kinds of security counter-
measures in the light of different threat and business environments (Kumar et al. 2008). Moreo-
ver, the effects that IT security investments have on reducing the incidence of data security 
breaches over time were analyzed (Angst et al. 2017). Methods and models for evaluation have 
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been suggested, for instance, by Bistarelli et al. (2012), Bodin et al. (2005), Cavusoglu et al. 
(2004), Chou et al. (2006), Cremonini & Martini (2005), Jing (2009), Locher (2005), Sheen 
(2010) and Wang et al. (2011). Several metrics have been introduced to measure improvements 
in the overall organizational performance rooted in information security investments, for exam-
ple, metrics that quantify the Return On Security Investment (ROSI), e.g., Anderson et al. 
(2008), Gordon & Loeb (2002a), the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), e.g., Buck et al. (2008) and 
Wawrzyniak (2006), Net Present Value (NPV), e.g., Eisenga et al. (2012) and Sheen (2010), 
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE), e.g., Cremonini & Martini (2005) and Tanaka et al. (2005) or 
Cumulated Abnormal Return (CAR), e.g., Andoh-Baidoo & Osei-Bryson (2007) and Campbell 
et al. (2003).  
There are a few case study approaches which have been used to understand investment and im-
plementation strategies, particularly focusing on the aspects which drive the level of security 
(Rowe & Gallaher 2006), to develop a risk management framework for evaluating information 
security spending by firms (Herath & Herath 2008) and to explore whether larger firms are mak-
ing better security investments (Dynes et al. 2005). Moreover, case studies have been utilized to 
support security investment decision-making (Beresnevichiene et al. 2010) and to investigate the 
question in which security solutions it is worth investing (Fenz et al. 2011). In addition, a series 
of empirical analyses of information security investment has been presented to verify the rela-
tionship between the vulnerability and effects of information security investment (Liu et al. 
2008). The ways in which corporations make decisions regarding information security invest-
ments has been examined with empirical studies: It was analyzed whether firms address the 
budgeting process in a rational economic manner (e.g., with cost-benefit analysis) (Gordon & 
Loeb 2006a). Moreover, Toivanen (2015) examines the information security investment decision 
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making process to understand why information security investment decisions fail. The goal of 
that study is to determine the influential drivers, which affect the information security investment 
decision-making. In another study, Dor & Elovici (2016) investigate the information security 
investment decision-making process focusing on different phases and concepts showing that the 
decision-making process is heavily depending on different organizational and psychological fac-
tors.  
In this study, we intend to extend current research that has focused on decision-making with 
evaluation and learning strategies. The strength of our case study lies in our theory-based per-
spective on information security investments: We use a “Resource-based Learning Model for 
Information Security Investments” based on Argyris et al. (1985), Melville et al. (2004) and 
Weishäupl et al. (2015), which frames firm-characteristic components such as business processes 
and security resources and, additionally, accounts for the repeated reevaluation of information 
security investments by dynamically incorporating the feedback of different learning strategies.  
3. Research Methodology  
We conducted an exploratory multiple case study (Yin 2003) to gain insights into information 
security investment management, which is a “deeper and more political problem than is usually 
realized” (Anderson 2001, p.364). Case studies have been recognized as an established approach 
to examine such complex phenomena (Majchrzak et al. 2000; Yin 2003), that cannot be con-
trolled by the researchers and which need to be investigated in their original settings (Dubé & 
Paré 2003; Liu et al. 2011; Paré 2004; Yin 2003). Several authors indicate that empirical ap-
proaches are well suited for the information security investment problem: For instance, Lederer 
et al. (1990) who used a case study for the management of cost estimation argues that the man-
agement of cost estimation is among those “sticky, practice-based problems where the experi-
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ences of the actors are important and the context of action critical” (Bonoma & Wong 1985, 
p.15; Lederer et al. 1990).  
The design of our exploratory case study is guided by the goal of understanding how information 
security investment decisions are made and evaluated in organizations. Analyzing several organ-
izations allows us to perform an “‘analytic generalization’, in which a […] theory is used as a 
template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin 2003, p.32). Our 
case study is interview-based, i.e. the results of our interviews are our data source and before the 
actual field visits, we developed a case study protocol as suggested by Yin (2003), which con-
tains the interview protocol and the open-ended interview questions.  
3.1 Theory-based Derivation of Interview Questions 
According to Procter et al. (1999, p.245), the use of theory in case studies is an “immense aid in 
defining the appropriate research design and data collection”. The interview questions arise 
from the model shown in Figure 1, namely the Resource-based Learning Model for Information 
Security Investments based on Argyris et al. (1985), Melville et al. (2004) and Weishäupl et al. 
(2015). We apply this theoretical model, which is developed by Weishäupl et al. (2015) and used 
by the authors for structuring their literature review on information security investments, as the 
basis for deriving our interview questions. The model accounts for the repeated reevaluation of 
information security investments by dynamically incorporating the feedback of single and double 
loop learning to adjust corresponding action strategies. In addition, the theoretical model frames 
firm-characteristic components such as business processes and security resources. The model 
comprises three main constructs, namely governing variables, action strategies and consequenc-
es and two learning strategies, single loop learning and double loop learning. Governing varia-
bles are defined as objectives a firms aims to gain (e.g., in the security context it would be a se-
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curity policy) including conformance to country- and industry-specific regulations and norms as 
well as demands from trading partners. Action strategies are steps to achieve the objectives (e.g., 
investment in resources such as an antivirus program) and are influenced by the security envi-
ronment variables.  Consequences include all results on processes and resources from the actions 
undertaken. The two learning strategies assure that there is a continuous process and alignment 
of an organization’s governing variables and its action strategies.  
 
Based on the Resource-based learning model l, we derive five research themes (RTs) shown in 
Table 1 and operationalize them to 35 interview questions (cf. Appendix), which were open in 
order to stimulate a discussion.  
In general, the developed research themes cover how firms make their decisions when investing 
in IT security resources regarding external factors and underlying decision processes, and how 
security processes and business processes are influenced thereby with respect to their perfor-
mances. It also includes what kind of metrics and evaluation processes firms apply and how 
firms learn from the results of those for future investments. The impact of the governing varia-
bles in the resource-based learning model, including country characteristics, industry characteris-
tics and trading partner resources & business processes on action strategies, is theorized in the 
first research theme: In the context of information security, an organization’s goal is guarantee-
ing a suitable security level, which is influenced by compliance with country characteristics, in-
dustry characteristics and trading partner resources & business processes that force organizations 
to implement new information security measures. For instance, an organization’s goal to align 
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with country-specific governmental regulations
1
 results in investments to pass IT security audits 
and obligatory requests of the general data protection regulation (GDPR) force organizations to 
value data protection.  
The second research theme covers action strategies which include managerial decisions to invest 
in various information security resources. In particular, it includes in which information security 
resources organizations invest in based on which underlying decision process. Regarding deci-
sion processes, IT security investment action strategies pertain to different resources, conceptual-
ized in the theoretical model as technological and human security resources. The decisions to 
invest in various IT security resources impact the security processes within the firm, which in 
turn have a direct influence on the business processes – yet the kind of impact and the measure-
ment remains nebulous.  
The third research theme deals with the implemented security processes and how business pro-
cesses are influenced thereby. According to the model, the IT business value generation process, 
including the processes, their performance, and the non-security resources, theorizes the influ-
ence on the overall organizational performance. The changes in the organizational performance 
achieved through information security investments, can be measured with metrics and assessed 
with evaluation processes.  
Research theme 4 copes thus with measurement of the efficiency and effectiveness of past in-
formation security investment decisions and the fifth research theme deals with learning strate-
gies – in particular how the results of evaluation processes of past investment decisions influence 
                                                             
1 For instance, acts such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) for financial firms, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act for account-
ing firms and the health insurance portability and accountability act (HIPAA) for healthcare providers (Khansa and Liginlal 
2009). 
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the investment decisions in the future and which learning strategy is used under specific circum-
stances. We address the organization’s learning strategy: Single loop and double loop learning 
with single loop being the more routine and double loop the more radical way of learning 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2000). Since single and double loop learning are intertwined strategies, an 
isolated consideration of single loop and double loop learning is not advisable.   
Based on the developed research themes, we specified 35 interview questions which do not differ 
semantically and syntactically for consulting firms and non-consulting firms (cf. Appendix). 
3.2 Research Sites  
We conducted interviews with 12 organizations: Seven consulting firms which consult their cli-
ents with regard to information security investments and five non-consulting firms. By inter-
viewing non-consulting firms, we gain insights into their information security investments, in 
particular their decision making, evaluation and learning strategies from past investment deci-
sions. As firms tend to be reluctant to disclose security-related inadequacies for fear of attacks 
and harm of reputation (Turoff & Plotnick 2012) and might not have deep expertise and com-
plete comprehension in information security, we additionally chose consulting firms as interview 
partners which consult their clients about information security investments. With the combina-
tion of the consulting and non-consulting firms’ answers, we benefit (1) from the consultants’ 
know-how, experience and concentrated knowledge on the security management of many organ-
izations, and (2) from the first-hand, comprehensive and detailed information from the non-
consulting firms. Moreover, members of non-consulting firms have situated and longitudinal 
knowledge and insights. With not only interviewing non-consulting firms but also consulting 
firms, we can overcome the deficiency that firms might not want to disclose security-related in-
adequacies and mistakes to us for fear of attacks and harm of reputation (Turoff & Plotnick 
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2012).  The combination of different interview partners offers knowledge about the research sub-
ject (Flick 2014; Flick 2008) and our case study aligns with similar studies which have also used 
the combination of different interview partners, e.g., A. W. Baur et al. (2015) and Krücken 
(2003).  
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
The data collection involved interviews conducted in February 2016 with seven consulting firms 
and five non-consulting firms which are located in Europe. Table 2 and 3 show the anonymized 
profiles of the firms; anonymization was necessary due to non-disclosure agreements. The types 
of interviewees as listed in row 2 (Interviewee(s)) in Table 2 and 3 show that they are “elite” 
(Yin 2011, p.56) as they are “persons of high stature which fill a unique role and can provide 
distinctive insights” (Yin 2011, p.56). For confidentiality reasons the consulting and non-
consulting firms are referred to as CF 1 to CF 7 and NCF 1 to NCF 5 in this article. The partici-
pating companies represent a wide variety of firm sizes so that our multiple case study addresses 
issues of information security investments over different sectors of industry. Overall, our case 
study comprises insights of managers from different hierarchical levels, working for firms of 
several vertical levels of the industry, i.e., OEMs, suppliers and service providers, to form “a 
holistic picture and mitigate the possibility of missing important insights” (A. Baur et al. 2015, 
p.6).  
 
All 12 interviews were conducted by two of the authors and had an average duration of 90 
minutes. We conducted the in-person interviews at the interviewees’ workplaces, a natural envi-
ronment for discussing (Feldman & Horan 2011). Each interview was taped providing “a more 
accurate rendition of any interview than any other method” (Yin 2003, p.92), transcribed by a 
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third party, then reviewed by the authors for accuracy (Jones & Price 2001) and translated into 
English by the authors. 
After the data collection phase, the analysis of the data was conducted in three steps as done by 
Silva & Hirschheim (2007): (1) We organized the transcripts of the interviews using NVivo, a 
software for the analysis of qualitative data; (2) in NVivo, we coded the files along the five 
research themes as introduced in the previous subsection; (3) we synthesized the interview 
results by structuring their presentation along the five research themes.  
4. Empirical Findings  
In this section, we present the results of our case study by describing the answers of the inter-
viewees. The presentation is structured along the five research themes as they are derived in the 
previous section.  
4.1 Influence of External Factors on Decisions to Invest in Information Security Re-
sources 
The main external drivers for decisions to invest in information security are country characteris-
tics, including legal frameworks, regulations and acts which put high pressure on organizations. 
The same applies to obligatory industry-specific regulations and requirements of trading part-
ners. Typical statements made by our interviewees are shown in Table 4, where they are grouped 
by the types of external factors. Since information security is a complex problem and invest-
ments in information security measures have no obvious return, organizations tend to neglect its 
importance and refuse to take actions except for when they are compelled by laws to invest 
which were criticized by some interviewees regarding compliance and content: It has been noted 
that the mandatory minimum level required by law tends to be below the actual protection needs. 
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Additionally, our study reveals that, in practice, there are laws which, albeit not being directly 
related to information security, have an impact on investments in information security (e.g., 
German Criminal Code when handling digital medical records). The influence of external pres-
sure by the law has been confirmed by all interview partners, but the answers differed depending 
on industry and firm size. For instance, regulations are particularly important for the automotive 
industry and banks, and they become increasingly complex for organizations which operate in-
ternationally as several laws apply. It is notable that for many firms legal frameworks, regula-
tions and acts are the only driver for their information security investment decisions, neglecting 
other country characteristics, such as a country’s culture. Interestingly, most firms do not regard 
reputation as important unless there is a damage. However, few firms are driven in their infor-
mation security investment decision by the location of the organization, their image and fear 
caused by recent incidents.  
4.2 Investment in Information Security Resources based on Underlying Decision Pro-
cesses  
The resources in which a firm decides to invest are either technological or human: We found that 
organizations invest in “classical” technological and human security resources without any 
standardized decision processes. Most of the firms invest in “classical” technological resources 
(e.g., firewalls, antivirus programs) and “classical” human security resources (e.g., CISO, work-
shops) which is backed up with exemplarily statements of our interview partners in Table 5. All 
of the interviewees answered the corresponding interview questions by providing examples for 
technological and human security resources that are commonly invested in. However, the distinc-
tion between security and non-security IT resources and their allocation to different budgets is 
blurry in the daily business operations. The reason for that is that technological IT security re-
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sources (e.g., firewall) are managed by the IT department. In contrast to technological security 
resources, the investment in human security resources depends on the industry and size of the 
firm: Large organizations and firms in critical industries (e.g., finance and telecommunication) 
employ a CISO and have dedicated departments for information security. This trend is extending 
to smaller firms and other industries due to a rising awareness of the importance of information 
security. Moreover, many firms that invest in external security consultants  not only aim at bene-
fiting from external know-how but they also intend to hand over the responsibility for security 
incidents.  
Decisions to determine the optimal amount, time and allocation of security investments are made 
by the CISO in collaboration with the information security department (if it exists) and the CIO 
depending on the CISO’s hierarchical position within the organization. Different opinions and 
preferences are discussed without using formal multi-stakeholder decision models, instead pilot 
tests or attack simulations are carried out as pointed out in statements (cf. Table 5). Overall, in-
vestments in technological and human information security resources are mostly made based on 
risk analyses or gut feeling. 
 
4.3 Security Processes and their Influence on Business Processes and Measurement of 
Process Performances 
With the help of various information security resources, firms often establish security processes 
to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability of business operations, e.g., monitor-
ing, password change and backup processes. The CISO is in charge of monitoring the security 
processes but it has been noted that this responsibility should not lie within the CISO as he con-
trols the processes. Surprisingly, as indicated by the statements of our interview partners in Table 
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6, the impact of the security processes on the business processes was judged to be negative de-
spite its effect of increased security and expected decrease of breaches as they slow down the 
business processes. This even goes so far that CISOs are hesitant to introduce new security pro-
cesses because it could cause interruptions of business processes. Although security processes 
are regularly evaluated by external audits, the performance of security processes is rarely meas-
ured in practice because of its complexity. The effect of the security process performance on the 
business process performance is stated to be negative and not measured in numbers either. Over-
all, investments target various security processes in organizations despite its perceived negative 
impact on crucial business processes.  
 
4.4 Metrics and Evaluation Processes Used to Measure the Changes in Organizational 
Performance 
Similar to decision processes, evaluation processes are barely used in practice to evaluate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of information security investments. The lack of evaluation process-
es was stated by our interview partners as shown exemplarily in Table 7. This lack is rooted in 
the complexity and time expenditure of evaluating information security investment decisions. 
Industry specific differences could be observed, for instance, banks are required to audit their 
information security frequently. In general, firms are forced to evaluate their processes and sys-
tems when external pressure exists (audits), business processes do not run smoothly, or the IT 
budget is reallocated.  
Considering the use of metrics for information security investments, such as ROSI, we noted that 
these are not used in practice as pointed out by the interviewees (cf. Table 7). An explanation, 
which was underpinned by the interview findings, is that the metrics include assumptions which 
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are difficult to assess in practice so that - although the metrics could provide a benefit for deci-
sion makers - in their current form their applicability is limited because the metrics do not ade-
quately reflect the given facts embodied in practice. Therefore, evaluation processes, including 
metrics, are missing even though the academic literature provides various approaches. The con-
nection between information security investments and organizational performance is not consid-
ered in practice.  
 
4.5 Usage of Single and Double Loop Learning Strategy for Information Security In-
vestments 
From the two existing learning strategies, single loop and double loop learning, firms prefer, 
according to the interviews, single loop learning as a fast reaction to incidents rather than search-
ing for a long lasting rectification later on. However, (single loop and double loop) learning is 
always triggered by incidents and not intrinsically motivated. Representative statements from our 
interviewees are shown in Table 8, where they are grouped by the types of learning strategies. 
The reason for the incident-triggered behavior might be that, according to interview partners 
from consulting firms, information security is regarded as an unpleasant task. It was stated that 
for human security resources learning takes place because firms consider the fluctuation of the 
employees and the fact that employees quickly forget lessons learned in past workshops. Howev-
er, once technological security resources are installed, they are not reevaluated with regard to 
their suitability to changing environmental factors. Thus, for technological security resources, 
learning strategies are usually not applied.  
Our results on how firms evaluate the effectiveness of their information security investments and 
how they learn from past experience shows large consensus of all interview partners that no sys-
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tematic evaluation of information security investments occurs and no evaluation processes are 
implemented with the exception of those related to external pressure (e.g., external audits). The 
key reason of missing evaluation (processes) are unofficial “never change a running system” 
policies, many firms adhere to, i.e. improving has a lower priority than maintaining. As a conse-
quence, once information security resources have been purchased and installed, they are not re-
moved unless malfunctions or external pressure occur. The interview partners also agreed that 
although firms show some elements of learning, they have implement neither single loop learn-
ing (correcting errors in a routinely manner) nor double loop learning (fixing errors by aligning 
preferences and policies) strategies.  
Table 9 summarizes the empirical findings structured along the five research themes.  
5. Discussion  
While we found some consistencies with the academic literature, for example regarding the in-
fluence governing variables have on information security investments, interesting mismatches 
have emerged between the perspectives of researchers and practitioners. Structured by our re-
search themes, we discuss the results of our case study in comparison with the findings in aca-
demic literature and review the discrepancies in the statements between consulting and non-
consulting firms. Subsequently, we propose a research agenda to provide guidance for future 
research by assessing what we know and formulating concrete propositions at the end of our dis-
cussion. 
5.1 Influence of External Factors on Decisions to Invest in Information Security 
Resources 
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The three governing variables “Country Characteristics”, “Industry Characteristics” and “Trad-
ing Partner Resources & Business Processes” are crucial in the information security investment 
context. Our results reveal that the first two have the strongest influence on the firm’s infor-
mation security investment actions. The findings are consistent with literature on how firms 
make information security investment decisions: The academic literature highlights the im-
portance of standards, such as the ISO 27000 series and best practices (Chew et al. 2008), which 
is supported by our interviewees. The literature identified that a remarkably high percentage of 
companies are willing to implement the ISO27001 standard if they have not done already (Gillies 
2011). Incentives for implementation are demonstrating to partner firms and customers that the 
organization has determined and measured its security threats and deployed a security policy in 
order to mitigate risks (Saint-Germain 2005) and lowering insurance costs (von Solms & 
von Solms 2004).  
Regarding compliance with country and industry characteristic laws, there was a major differ-
ence of views between non-consulting and consulting firms: While the first indicated that firms 
comply with the legal requirements by all means, the latter one stated that fear of an imminent 
review for compliance is mandatory to trigger actions. From an interpretative perspective, we 
argue that there are two possibilities for this conflicting answer: First, there might be a lack of 
knowledge regarding information security-specific regulations in non-consulting firms, i.e. they 
might believe incorrectly that they cover all relevant factors until they get advised by information 
security specialists (e.g., consulting firms). Second, the non-consulting firms might embellish 
their current practice to us because of concerns regarding loss of reputation and embarrassment.  
A surprising statement was given by some interviewees that reputation is not seen as very im-
portant which contradicts our assumptions and the academic literature: For example, Nguyen & 
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Leblanc (2001) found out that corporate reputation are acknowledged as having the potential to 
impact on customer loyalty toward the firm and therefore influence information security invest-
ment decisions. The reason for this mismatch might be that firms perceive that reputational loss 
is given if and only if an attack has happened and was successful. To prevent these attacks, firms 
would need investments in security countermeasures. In the hope not to be affected by attacks, 
firms rather use that money for other, non-security projects.  
As the request for certification from the suppliers becomes more common in many sectors and 
complex due to globalization, the relationship of the certification need and its impact on invest-
ment decisions in information security of the suppliers has to be examined academically. In the 
academic literature, information sharing and outsourcing with trading partners is well researched 
(Anderson et al. 2008; Cezar et al. 2013; Gal-Or & Ghose 2005; Gao et al. 2015; Lacity et al. 
2009). However, our case study indicates that information sharing and outsourcing is of second-
ary importance compared to the request of certification from trading partners.  
5.2 Investment in Information Security Resources based on Underlying Decision 
Processes 
Organizations invest in “classical” technological and human security resources without any 
standardized decision processes. In contrast to the technological security resources, the invest-
ment in human security resources highly depends on the industry and size of the consulted firm: 
Large organizations and firms in critical industries (e.g., finance and telecommunication) employ 
a CISO and have an own department for information security. This trend is extending to smaller 
firm sizes and other industries due to a rising awareness of the importance of information securi-
ty.  
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While there is a clear differentiation from human non-security IT resources to human security IT 
resources, the distinction from technological non-security IT resources to technological security 
IT resources is blurry in practice. This lack of differentiation is problematic from an economic 
point of view because it is not possible to distinguish between an IT budget and an IT security 
budget. However, in literature, models and methods often require an IT security budget (Gordon 
& Loeb 2002b; Gordon & Loeb 2002a; Mukhopadhyay et al. 2013; Olifer et al. 2017). Literature 
often provides models which require the IT security budget as a precondition: For example, 
game-theoretical models use IT security budget constraints and are evaluated with fictitious firm 
data (Liu et al. 2014). We assume that as long as such models require specifying the IT security 
budget, they are difficult to apply in firms. This assumption was backed up by our interview 
partners. Academic literature should provide explicit guidelines for the distinction of IT budget 
and IT security budget. 
The employment of a person who is in charge of information security is quite prevalent, whether 
he is named Security Director, Security Manager, Information Security Officer or Chief Infor-
mation Security Officer. The variety of notation was named during our interviews and is backed 
up in literature (Fitzgerald 2007). The exact title is not as important as the appointed hierarchical 
position with respect to the CIO. With regard to our theoretical model, learning from past in-
vestments (employment of a CISO) should lead to an investment in a promotion of the CISO’s 
hierarchy because of insufficient influence which had resulted in inadequate protection. The po-
sition of the CISO compared to the CIO has also been discussed in literature even whether he 
should “have a chair at the board table” (Klimoski 2016, p.15). With a chair at the board table, 
the CISO would be part of the organizations leadership members and in a better position to en-
sure that his security concerns have the full comprehension of the management team (Wylder 
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2003). In practice, there is a reluctance of including the CISO in the executive board. Reasons 
might be that security is still perceived as disruptive to business operations which are seen as top 
priority or information security is regarded as technical issue but not core business activities 
(Neubauer et al. 2006). 
Regarding investments in information security awareness, training and workshops of a firm’s 
employees, all interview partners acknowledged the importance which is backed up by the aca-
demic literature (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010; McCrohan et al. 2010; Puhakainen & Siponen 
2010; Stewart & Lacey 2012). There are several factors which need to be considered when it 
comes to information security awareness. Besides cultural diversity, one of the main factors 
which is not examined in depth is the varying knowledge level of employees: Some employees 
might be cautious inherently or because of private experiences while others are not. Based on 
this initial level of knowledge, the content of the security awareness trainings have to be adapted 
to reach a sufficient security awareness level for the specific firm and the employee’s position.  
All interview partners stated that no standardized decision processes have been established to 
determine the optimal amount, time and allocation of investments. This is in line with the find-
ings of prior research that this decision-making process is biased and depends on organizational 
and psychological factors (Dor & Elovici 2016). Reasons for this might be that the lack of com-
mon language between decision-makers and information security experts (Toivanen 2015). 
There is discrepancy between the statements of the consulting and non-consulting firms: While, 
the non-consulting firms noted that methods such as risk analysis, business impact analysis, at-
tack simulations, and cost-benefit and cost-effort analysis are conducted, the consulting firms 
took a more negative view. According to consulting firms, the decision to invest in technological 
and human information security resources are mostly based on gut feeling or are discussed be-
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tween CISO and CIO without using formal multi-stakeholder decision models. A reason for this 
discrepancy might be that consultants do not have thorough insights in firms’ internal decision 
processes whereas non-consulting firms can clearly report what kind of methods are implement-
ed. An alternative explanation might be that non-consulting firms tend to embellish their current 
practices to hide their inexperience and lack of knowledge by saying they were doing far more 
than they actually were. Finally, we observe a large gap between decision models and methodol-
ogies suggested in the literature (Cavusoglu et al. 2008; Tsiakis & Stephanides 2005; Wang et al. 
2008) and their use in practice. We assume that, due to the high complexity of information secu-
rity investment decisions, practitioners tend to not apply them. Additionally, as confirmed by 
literature, “it has been notoriously hard to justify investments in information security, […] since 
security investments to not generate any additional revenue” (Dutta & Roy 2008, pp.367–369).  
5.3 Security Processes and their Influence on Business Processes and Measure-
ment of Process Performances 
We find an interesting mismatch between the perspectives of researchers and practitioners on 
what makes firms implement security processes: While researchers claim that security processes 
are crucial and are intrinsically motivated (Ashenden 2008; Massacci et al. 2005) because they 
reduce risk and lead to an efficiently designed, implemented and deployed security architecture 
(Oppliger 2007), practitioners install security processes mainly because they have to. The as-
signment of the responsibility and control of the security process tend to be noticed as an im-
portant factor which should be researched in future. As an example, security processes should be 
controlled or reviewed externally to ascertain the CISO’s proper installation of the security pro-
cess. The security process is set to impact the business process in a disturbing way: We conclude 
that security processes are perceived as time-consuming and troublesome by the non-consulting 
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firms while the consulting firms state that this view is exactly the problem. However, the unim-
peded execution of a business process is crucial for a firm’s success (Neubauer & Heurix 2008; 
Wang et al. 2008). That is why a mind change has to take place and it must be emphasized that 
there is a trade-off. On the one hand, security processes protect the business processes, whereas 
on the other hand they should not be set too restrictive in order not to slow down productivity. 
The measurement of the quality of security processes is mainly implemented through external 
audits in practice which should be backed up with numbers resulting from metrics. Academic 
literature should provide those metrics to measure the quality of security processes.  
5.4 Metrics and Evaluation Processes Used to Measure the Changes in Organiza-
tional Performance 
Due to the complexity and time expenditure of evaluating information security investment deci-
sions, evaluation processes are not applied in practice which contravenes the academic literature 
providing several methods, models and processes for evaluation (Barnard & von Solms 2000; 
Bistarelli et al. 2012; Bodin et al. 2005; Cremonini & Martini 2005; Eloff & Von Solms 2000; 
Knapp et al. 2009; Vroom & von Solms 2004). Academia provides several metrics (Jansen 2011; 
Tsiakis & Stephanides 2005) which are not applicable in practice due to lack of information or 
inaccurate assumptions. Evaluating information security investments is a challenging task be-
cause the return on investments in security resources whether tangible (e.g., firewalls) or intangi-
ble (e.g., workshops) is difficult to estimate as security incidents may be prevented or it could 
have been that there were no security incidents to be prevented. All of the interview partners 
agreed on this point whereas industry specific differences were described, for instance, for banks. 
However, firms are forced to evaluate when external pressure exists (audits), business processes 
do not run smoothly, or the IT budget is reallocated.  
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Evaluation processes, including metrics, are missing in practice even though the academic litera-
ture provides hereto a lot of various approaches (vom Brocke et al. 2007; Andoh-Baidoo & Osei-
Bryson 2007; Böhme & Nowey 2008; Berinato 2002; Campbell et al. 2003; Cremonini & 
Martini 2005; Eisenga et al. 2012; Gordon & Loeb 2002b; Gordon & Loeb 2002a; Gordon et al. 
2003; Kwon & Johnson 2014; Mizzi 2010; Rowe & Gallaher 2006; Sheen 2010; Sonnenreich et 
al. 2005; Tanaka et al. 2005).  
 
5.5 Usage of Single and Double Loop Learning Strategy for Information Security 
Investments 
In academia, the concept of single loop and double loop learning gains relevance (Hwang & 
Wang 2016; Reychav et al. 2016; Vallerand et al. 2017). With the increasing sophistication in 
attacks (Baskerville et al. 2014), the two types of learning have become essential in firms 
(Ahmad et al. 2012): Organizations need both single loop and double loop learning to secure 
their systems (Mattia & Dhillon 2003). In the literature, organizational learning in the infor-
mation security context is present as described (Ahmad et al. 2015; Schlienger & Teufel 2005). 
In practice, from the two existing learning strategies firms prefer, according to the interviews, 
single loop learning as a fast reaction to incidents rather than searching for a long lasting rectifi-
cation later on. However, (single loop and double loop) learning is always triggered by incidents 
and not intrinsically motivated.  
Our empirical results reveal that no systematic evaluation of information security investments 
takes place and evaluation processes are only implemented when triggered by external pressure. 
All interview partners concurred that firms neither implement single loop learning nor double 
loop learning strategies. 
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We summarize the insights of our empirical study in Table 10, which aligns and contrasts our 
findings with those of prior research. Table 10 also contrasts findings regarding consulting firms 
with those regarding non-consulting firms. 
As a research agenda to provide guidance for future research, we assess what we know and for-
mulate the concrete key propositions derived from our discussion (Table 11): 
Proposition 1 highlights the importance of external regulatory and industry-specific factors for 
organizational information security investment actions. The academic literature deals exhaustive-
ly with impacts of information security specific laws (Connolly & Lang 2013; Ghose & Rajan 
2006; Kwon & Johnson 2014; Park et al. 2017), yet it is silent on laws which are not directly 
related to information security but do influence actions as one interviewee stated for the health 
care sector (cf. Table 4). For practice, this implicates the challenging task of including all rele-
vant regulatory and industry-specific factors even if not directly related to information security at 
a first glance. Under the aspect of internationally operating organizations where data is distribut-
ed globally, these complex legal requirements should be in focus both for firms and for academic 
research. 
Proposition 2 notes that standardized decision processes are not applied. The academic literature 
has proposed various analyses to address information security investment decision-making 
(Bojanc & Jerman-Blažic 2012; Bojanc & Jerman-Blažic 2008; Bojanc et al. 2012; Huang & 
Behara 2013; Huang et al. 2014; Qian et al. 2017). While these approaches provide crucial input 
to determine the optimal amount, time and allocation of investments, the embedding within an 
organization’s decision process is not carried out. A practical implication might be that firms 
allocate too little financial resources in information security countermeasures which might lead 
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to higher risks of incidents. From an academic point of view, a potential approach might be the 
inclusion of standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 when developing information security models. 
From a practical view, such models could be better adopted within firms because as our inter-
views revealed, many firms already rely on this standard 
Proposition 3 deals with the implications of security processes for business processes. In the aca-
demic literature, it was acknowledged that security processes may have a positive impact on the 
organizational performance if it leads to a reduction of potential risks (Böhme & Nowey 2008). 
With the rising number of security threats, security processes, which are - according to the litera-
ture - supposed to guarantee the proper operation of business processes, i.e., secure business pro-
cesses, need to be discussed by organizations. The security of business processes has been ad-
dressed in the literature by modeling business processes with security elements through business 
process diagrams, for example, in a health care business process (Rodriguez et al. 2007). Jakoubi 
et al. (2009) examine scientific research efforts in the field of security- and risk-related business 
process/workflow management and provide a representative overview of the efforts in this field. 
They conclude that the research on the establishment of security processes and their effects on 
business processes is still a very young field. It has been recommended that security processes 
should be designed in the way that security experts have to effectively communicate security-
related concerns to other stakeholders, who have different risk preferences and regard security 
not as a first priority within the firm (Werlinger et al. 2009).  
Proposition 4 points out that metrics regarding information security investment, such as ROSI, 
are practically not used. In the literature, there are several approaches to measuring the impact of 
investment in IT security resources on the organizational performance with the help of ROSI 
(Buck et al. 2008; Mizzi 2010). However, one of the problems with ROSI for instance is that 
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there is no standardized computation and definition of it (vom Brocke et al. 2007): It is some-
times computed as an absolute value (Berinato 2002), or a quotient (Sonnenreich et al. 2005) but 
in most cases the computation as an absolute value is preferred (vom Brocke et al. 2007). Anoth-
er problem is that these metrics require inputs which cannot be assessed or estimated by firms. 
This implicates that organizations rely on their managers’ and experts’ gut feelings which lead to 
rather subjective and unprecise results. In order to transparently plan and assign financial re-
sources to information security countermeasures, academic models, which fulfill the require-
ments of availability of inputs, to measure the information security level are crucial.   
Proposition 5 describes that firms prefer single loop learning as a fast reaction to incidents rather 
than searching for a long lasting rectification. In the context of information security, either dou-
ble loop learning or a combination of single loop and double loop learning is advised in the aca-
demic literature: Single loop learning is not sufficient and organizations should focus on double 
loop learning (Rowe 1996; Van Niekerk & Solms 2004) because double loop learning is the 
more radical way of learning as it questions not only the action strategies but also the compliance 
with the governing variables. Implications for practice is that security-related problems and the 
underlying assumptions are not dealt the correct way (Mattia & Dhillon 2003; Van Niekerk & 
Solms 2004). A solution which can be applied by organizations is to deploy single and double 
loop learning to guarantee both short-term reaction and long-lasting rectifications. It would fur-
ther help organizations to solve security problems that are complex: The combination of single 
and double loop learning strategy results in analyzing alterations in compliance with underlying 
governing variables and thus creates a mindset that consciously seeks out security problems in 
order to resolve them (Mattia & Dhillon 2003).   
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6. Conclusion  
In this study, we examined firms’ decision-making, evaluation and learning from past investment 
decisions. We extend current research (Dor & Elovici 2016; Toivanen 2015) by providing a 
thorough and theory-grounded look at how information security investments are undertaken in 
practice. Our case study reveals that (1) firms’ investments in information security are largely 
driven by external environmental and industry-related factors, such as legal regulations, industry-
specific demands and requirements of partner firms respectively, (2) standardized decision pro-
cesses as provided by academic literature are not applied in practice, (3) security processes are 
perceived as having a troublesome and time-consuming effect on business processes, (4) both the 
implementation of evaluation processes and the application of metrics are hardly existent and (5) 
learning activities mainly occur on an ad-hoc basis. 
However, our study is not without limitations: Although we strived to have a broad variety of 
different sectors and firm sizes, we cannot claim a generalization. Besides, the adoption of our 
theoretical view focusses on information security investments and activities of organizations. IS 
security phenomena at the individual level, for example learning of individuals, are out of our 
work’s scope. 
We hope that our case study encourages researchers to conduct new research on (1) how the in-
terplay between the different external factors are considered in information security investment 
decisions and (2) how the implementation of evaluation processes and learning strategies can be 
supported in firms so that information security investments become more effective in practice. 
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Figure 1. A Resource-based Learning Model for Information Security Investments based on Argyris 
et al. (1985), Melville et al. (2004) and Weishäupl et al. (2015) 
 
 
Table 1. Research Themes 
RT 1: Influence of External Factors on Decisions to Invest in Information Security Resources 
RT 2: Investment in Information Security Resources based on Underlying Decision Process 
RT 3: Security Processes and their Influence on Business Processes and Measurement of Process 
Performances 
RT 4: Metrics and Evaluation Processes Used to Measure the Changes in Organizational Perfor-
mance 
RT 5: Usage of Single and Double Loop Learning Strategy for Information Security Investments 
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Table 2. Profiles of the Interviewed Consulting Firms 
 CF 1 CF 2 CF 3 CF 4 CF 5 CF 6 CF 7 
Interviewee(s) 
Chief Ex-
ecutive 
Officer & 
Consultant 
Chief 
Executive  
Officer 
Sales 
Director &  
Director 
Marketing 
Senior 
Manager 
& Con-
sultant 
Senior 
Manager 
Senior 
Manager Consultant 
Number of  
employees <100 <20
 <100 <100,000 >100,000 < 5,000 <100,000 
 
Table 3. Profiles of the Interviewed Non-Consulting Firms 
 NCF 1  NCF 2  NCF 3  NCF 4  NCF 5 
Sector of 
Industry 
Tertiary  
sector 
Secondary 
sector 
Secondary 
 sector 
Tertiary  
sector 
Quaternary 
sector 
Interviewee(s) CISO CISO 
Head of IT 
Governance 
and Head of IT 
Security  
Strategy 
CEO Head of  Data Center 
Number of  
employees < 3,000 < 5,000
 < 50,000 < 20 < 100 
 
 
Table 4. Empirical Findings - Effect of External Factors 
External Factors Statements of Interview Partners  
Country Character-
istics 
 “We have to comply with the German Federal Data Protection Act and the IT 
Security Act. We are not allowed to do anything what violates data protection.” 
(NCF 1) 
 “A big customer uses encryption because he is forced by the German Criminal 
Code, which contains regulations concerning medical confidentiality. The com-
pany physician keeps digital medical records which could otherwise be accessed 
by the IT staff.” (CF 3) 
 “I need to consider why I have to invest in information security and, economically 
thinking there are only two possibilities: Either my reputation is damaged or I am 
forced externally by laws to act.” (NCF 5) 
Industry Character-
istics 
 “If I want to operate a business in the credit card industry, I have to comply with 
PCI DSS.” (CF 2) 
 In the health care sector “a data transmission standard enters into force when 
data is transmitted but it is rather a technical standard.” (CF 3) 
Trading Partner 
Resources & Busi-
ness Processes 
 “A few OEMs designed their own standard which suppliers need to comply with.” 
(NCF 2) 
 “Outsourcing is common in particular in large firms […]. For instance, those ex-
ternal partners are also involved in the security management of the firm.” (CF 7). 
 “We observe a trend in the area of application development that large customers 
demand certifications.” (NCF 3) 
 “The construction sector is comparatively slow-moving when it comes to security 
awareness, meaning that they do not attach great importance to certifications. In 
comparison, industrial companies increasingly demand that we proof the security 
of our systems.” (NCF 3) 
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Table 5. Empirical Findings – IT Security Resources based on Decision Processes 
Resources and  
Processes 
Statements of Interview Partners  
Technological IT Se-
curity Resources 
 “Every company has basic technical equipment that the market has to offer.” 
(CF 7) 
 “The technological solutions require the least workload because they are the 
easiest to implement. Organizational countermeasures are more laborious.” 
(NCF 2) 
 “The advantage of technological measures is that they are preventive and we 
always try to work preventively when it comes to security.” (NCF 2) 
Human IT Security 
Resources 
 “In particular, industries in which information is of critical importance, such as 
the finance and telecommunication industry, do have a CISO” (CF 6) and “in 
large automotive firms, you can expect to find CISO positions.” (CF 7) 
 “If the CISO is located hierarchically below the CIO, which is very common, 
then he will not have significant influence” (CF 6).  
 “Because of conflicts of interest, it would make sense to grant the CISO inde-
pendence from the CIO.” (CF 2) 
 “You will regularly find dedicated security departments in large organizations. 
In smaller organizations such a structure is less common.” (CF 6) 
 “I have barely seen large [security] departments, even in bigshot companies. I 
am not aware of a core team which consists of more than 10 people and we 
are talking about a global company.” (CF 3) 
 “Awareness is a complex issue that has not yet been discovered entirely. Influ-
encing the behavior of 200,000 employees is a challenging task. In addition, IT 
security tends to be managed by technicians who are more knowledgeable in 
technology rather than in human behavior.” (CF 3) 
Underlying Decision 
Processes  
 “We use a two-dimensional matrix, either with costs-effort or cost-benefit. 
Sometimes, a strategy pyramid is of help.” (NCF 2) 
 Assets which need to be protected tend to be determined based on a risk anal-
ysis (CF 4) but “risk depends on the probability of occurrence which is always a 
gut feeling. That’s the problem of risk no matter which risk model you use.” (CF 
2) 
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Table 6. Empirical Findings – Analysis of Security Processes 
Analysis of  
Security Processes 
Statements of Interview Partners  
Security Process and 
Influence on Business 
Process 
 “Most organizations have established security processes which determine ac-
cess to buildings, departments and individual rooms or the interaction with visi-
tors. The ‘C’ and ‘A’ in the PCDA cycle is missing in most organizations […]. 
Most firms regard it rather as a state than a process.” (CF 3) 
 “The business process runs without the security process: That is exactly the 
problem: […] The business has to run and security is not part of what is neces-
sary as the business also runs without any security precautions.” (CF 3) 
 “Security disturbs the employees because of long passwords and requirements 
to change passwords regularly.” (CF 3) 
 “IT security is at its best when it is unseen by employees.” (CF 3) 
 “A mind change is necessary. Security is a core part of the business process 
otherwise it would not be needed.” (CF 3) 
Security Process 
Performance 
 The quality of security processes “can be measured by withstanding external 
audits, for instance ISO 27001. I do think that this is the only quality criterion.” 
(CF 3) 
 ”Audits are the classic tool for monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness of 
security processes.” (CF 4) 
 
Table 7. Empirical Findings – Security Metrics and Evaluation Processes 
Metrics and  
Processes 
Statements of Interview Partners  
Security Metrics  “Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Key Goal Indicators (KGIs), for exam-
ple uptimes, are mainly used in large organizations.” (CF 2) 
 “ROSI is a very abstract and theoretical metric and includes a considerable 
element of uncertainty.” (NCF 2) 
 “There are no metrics used on how many viruses have been stopped or 
whether a cheaper or better application is available.” (CF 1) 
Evaluation  
Processes 
 “At the end of the year, a retrospect takes place but there are no evaluation 
processes.” (NCF 4) 
 “During my term in office, I have never found a single evaluation process es-
tablished by a client.” (CF 1) 
 “We evaluate information security investments based on gut feeling, not based 
on metrics.” (NCF 3) 
 It is more common that external and internal audits are carried out: “External 
audits are conducted in order to check whether the processes are implemented 
properly” (CF 7) and “internal audits are conducted based on a standardized 
questionnaire. Moreover, our customers visit and perform an audit.” (NCF 2) 
 “Firms know their revenue and how much they have invested in information 
security but quantifying the link is difficult because you do not know how many 
attacks and how much loss are prevented.” (CF 5) 
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Table 8. Empirical Findings – Learning Strategies 
Learning Strategies Statements of Interview Partners  
Single Loop Learning  “When a firm is satisfied with their security measures, it tries to maintain the 
status quo as improving has a lower priority than maintaining. They only im-
prove something if there is a problem. In practice, decisions to invest are al-
ways event-driven.” (CF 3) 
 “As organizations are profit-driven, the objective is always to solve existing 
problems with minimal effort and costs.” (CF 2) 
 “In large firms in which fluctuation is high, the CEO is interested in increasing 
profit in this very year to benefit his reputation because he might be replaced 
soon and investing in security is a long-term investment.” (CF 2) 
Double Loop Learn-
ing 
 “First, we apply selective countermeasures where needed. Then we make a 
big fix when the budget plan is developed for the next year. During the year, 
there is no money for a big fix, only for little countermeasures.” (NCF 2) 
 “We regularly gain an overview of the threat level and how we are prepared 
against these threats so that we can react quickly to changing situations.” 
(NCF 2) 
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Table 9. Summary of Empirical Findings 
Research Theme Empirical Findings 
RT 1: Influence of Ex-
ternal Factors on Deci-
sions to Invest in In-
formation Security Re-
sources 
 Main external drivers are country characteristics, legal frameworks, regula-
tions and acts which are mandatory and put pressure on organizations 
 The influence of the external pressure by laws depends on industry and firm 
size 
 Few firms are driven in their information security investment decision by their 
location, their image and fear caused by recent incidents 
 Firms invest in “classical” technological (firewalls, antivirus programs etc.) 
and human security resources (e.g., CISO, workshops for employees) without 
any standardized decision processes 
 The investment in human security resources depends on the industry and 
size 
- Large organizations and firms in critical industries employ a CISO and 
have dedicated departments for information security  
- This trend is extending to smaller firm sizes and other industries due to a 
rising awareness of the importance of information security 
RT 2: Investment in 
Information Security 
Resources based on 
Underlying Decision 
Processes 
 Decisions are made by the CISO in collaboration with the information security 
department (if it exists) and the CIO depending on the CISO’s hierarchical 
position within the organization 
 Different opinions and preferences are discussed without using formal multi-
stakeholder decision models 
 Investments in technological and human information security resources are 
mostly made based on risk analyses or gut feeling 
RT 3: Security Pro-
cesses and their Influ-
ence on Business Pro-
cesses and Measure-
ment of Process Per-
formances  
 Firms often establish security processes to safeguard the confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability of business 
 Impact of the security processes on the business processes was judged to be 
negative 
 Security processes are regularly evaluated by external audits 
 Performance of security processes is rarely measured in practice because of 
its complexity 
 Effect of the security process performance on the business process perfor-
mance is stated to be negative and not measured in numbers  
RT 4: Metrics and 
Evaluation Processes 
Used to Measure the 
Changes in Organiza-
tional Performance  
 Evaluation processes are barely used in practice to evaluate the effective-
ness and efficiency of information security investments 
 Firms are forced to evaluate when external pressure exists (audits), business 
processes do not run smoothly, or the IT budget is reallocated 
 The usage of metrics for information security investments is absent: 
- Metrics include assumptions which are difficult to assess in practice 
- In their current form, metrics’ applicability is limited because they do not 
adequately reflect the given facts embodied in practice 
RT 5: Usage of Single 
and Double Loop 
Learning Strategy for 
Information Security 
Investments 
 Learning strategy is always triggered by incidents and not motivated intrinsi-
cally 
 Firms prefer single loop learning as a fast reaction to incidents rather than 
searching for a long lasting rectification 
 For human security resources learning takes place because firms consider 
the fluctuation of the employees and the fact that employees quickly forget 
lessons learned in past workshops 
 Once technological security resources are installed, they are not questioned 
any more with regard to their suitability to changing environmental factors 
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Table 10. Empirical Insights in the Light of Previous Findings and in the Light of Distinguishing 
Consulting and Non-consulting Firms 
Research Themes Aligning New Insights with the   
Literature 
Distinguishing New Insights 
for  
Consulting Firms from those 
for  
Non-Consulting Firms 
RT 1: Influence of External Fac-
tors on Decisions to Invest in 
Information Security Resources 
Consensus regarding the im-
portance of standards, e.g., ISO 
27000 series (e.g., Calder 2009; 
Gillies 2011; Humphreys 2006) 
Mismatch regarding compliance 
with legal requirements. While 
non-consulting firms indicate a 
compliance by all means, the 
consulting firms noted fear as a 
mandatory trigger for compli-
ance. 
RT 2: Investment in Information 
Security Resources based on 
Underlying Decision Process 
Mismatch regarding distinction 
between IT budget and IT securi-
ty budget: Models in literature 
require an IT security budget 
(e.g., Bojanc & Jerman-Blažic 
2008; Bojanc et al. 2012; Gordon 
& Loeb 2006a), whereas in prac-
tice this distinction is blurry.  
Match regarding the absence of 
standardized decision-processes 
(Dor & Elovici 2016). 
Mismatch regarding decision 
processes: According to consult-
ing firms, decisions are based on 
gut feeling, non-consulting firms 
reported that methods (e.g., risk 
analysis) are used. 
RT 3: Security Processes and 
their Influence on Business Pro-
cesses and Measurement of 
Process Performances  
Mismatch regarding motivation to 
implement security processes: In 
literature, security processes are 
motivated intrinsically (e.g., 
Ashenden 2008; Massacci et al. 
2005), whereas in practice, the 
implementation of security pro-
cesses is extrinsically motivated. 
Mismatch regarding the impact of 
security processes on business 
processes: In non-consulting 
firms, security processes are 
perceived as slowing down the 
business processes. Consulting 
firms recognize this fact as the 
main problem and propose a 
mind change in the tradeoff be-
tween the importance of security 
processes and their negative 
impact on the business process-
es.  
RT 4: Metrics and Evaluation 
Processes Used to Measure the 
Changes in Organizational Per-
formance  
Mismatch regarding evaluation 
processes: Evaluation processes 
are barely used in practice which 
contravenes academic literature 
providing several models, meth-
ods and processes for evaluation 
(e.g., Eloff & Von Solms 2000; 
Knapp et al. 2009; Vroom & 
von Solms 2004). We also found 
a mismatch regarding metrics: 
While academia provides several 
metrics (Jansen 2011; Tsiakis & 
Stephanides 2005), in practice 
none of them is applicable due to 
lack of information. 
Consensus regarding evaluation 
processes: All of the interview 
partners stated that evaluating 
information security investments 
is difficult as the estimation of the 
return on investments is chal-
lenging.  
RT 5: Usage of Single and Dou-
ble Loop Learning Strategy for 
Information Security Investments 
Mismatch regarding the opinion 
on double loop learning: In aca-
demic literature double loop 
Consensus that in firms a “never 
change a running system” strate-
gy / policy is applied, i.e. no 
Page 49 of 51
 Exploratory Multiple Case Study on Information Security Investments 
  
- 50 - 
learning is recommended and 
single loop learning is seen as 
inaccurate (e.g., Argyris 1977a; 
Argyris 1977b; Argyris 1976; 
Argyris et al. 1985). In practice, 
single loop learning is a fast re-
action to incidents which is ap-
propriate in case of attacks. 
learning takes place.  
 
 
Table 11. Derived Key Propositions 
Proposition 1 The external regulatory and industry-specific factors have the strongest influence on the 
firm’s information security investment actions. 
Proposition 2 No standardized decision processes are applied to determine the optimal amount, time 
and allocation of investments. 
Proposition 3 The security process impacts the business process in a disturbing way. 
Proposition 4 Metrics regarding information security investment, such as ROSI, are practically not 
used. 
Proposition 5 Firms prefer single loop learning as a fast reaction to incidents rather than searching for 
a long lasting rectification. 
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Appendix  
Table 12. Research Themes and Corresponding Interview Questions  
Research Theme Interview Questions 
RT 1: Influence of Ex-
ternal Factors on Deci-
sions to Invest in In-
formation Security Re-
sources 
 Which external influences have to be considered when undertaking IT securi-
ty investments? 
 Do industry standards or norms exist?  
 Are there any regulative frameworks? 
 Are there any best practice approaches, which have to be considered? 
 Are there any customer-specific or trading partner-specific demands that 
need to be considered? (e.g., necessary certifications) 
RT 2: Investment in 
Information Security 
Resources based on 
Underlying Decision 
Processes 
 Which IT security resources do exist? (personnel or material resources) 
 Is there a distinction between non-security and security resources? 
 How is the necessity of investment in IT security resources viewed?  
 What are the IT security resources frequently invested in? 
 Are there any decision processes when undertaking investments in IT securi-
ty resources? If so, which are these? 
 How are external influences included in IT security investment decision pro-
cesses? 
 How are objectives included in the decision processes? 
 What kind of data or information are included in these decision processes? 
 Are these processes standardized? 
 Who are the process owners or decision makers?   
 Are there various decision makers / stakeholders with different kind of prefer-
ences? (e.g., technical department, CIO, …) 
 What are the different objectives of the stakeholders? 
 Are these objectives at odds?  
 How are these conflicting objectives treated or solved? 
RT 3: Security Pro-
cesses and their Influ-
ence on Business Pro-
cesses and Measure-
ment of Process Per-
formances  
 Are there any security processes which secure the confidentiality, availability 
and integrity of the firm (e.g., authentication processes which manage the ac-
cess to firm’s facilities)? If so, which are these?  
 How is the impact of security processes on business processes viewed, 
treated and measured? 
 How is the quality of security processes measured? 
 Are these security processes standardized? 
 Who is in charge of the security processes? 
 How are the security processes evaluated?  
RT 4: Metrics and 
Evaluation Processes 
Used to Measure the 
Changes in Organiza-
tional Performance  
 What kind of evaluation processes take place in order to determine and to 
measure the improvement of the business processes and the overall organi-
zational performance through IT security investments? 
 Which data are included in these evaluation processes? 
 How are external impacts included in these evaluation processes? 
 Is a relation between IT security resources and revenue established? 
 Are metrics to evaluate IT security investments used? If so, which are these?  
 What kind of process metrics are used? 
RT 5: Usage of Single 
and Double Loop 
Learning Strategy for 
Information Security 
Investments 
 What is the frequency of evaluating the results from IT security investments? 
 How are the results of evaluation processes from past investment decisions 
included in future investment decision processes? 
 Is the focus on solving existing problems in order to improve the existing sys-
tem without major modifications after having evaluated? If so, how? Are there 
any examples?  
 Do the conclusions from evaluation processes result in changes, modifica-
tions of the framework conditions, objectives or assumptions? If so, how? Are 
there any examples?  
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